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Denotational semantics for modal systems S3–S5
extended by axioms for propositional quantifiers
and identity
Steffen Lewitzka∗
Abstract
There are logics where necessity is defined by means of a given identity con-
nective: ϕ := ϕ ≡ ⊤ (⊤ is a tautology). On the other hand, in many stan-
dard modal logics the concept of propositional identity (PI) ϕ ≡ ψ can be de-
fined by strict equivalence (SE) (ϕ ↔ ψ). All these approaches to modality
involve a principle that we call the Collapse Axiom (CA): “There is only one
necessary proposition.” In this paper, we consider a notion of PI which relies on
the identity axioms of Suszko’s non-Fregean logic SCI . Then S3 proves to be
the smallest Lewis modal system where PI can be defined as SE. We extend S3
to a non-Fregean logic with propositional quantifiers such that necessity and PI
are integrated as non-interdefinable concepts. CA is not valid and PI refines SE.
Models are expansions of SCI -models. We show that SCI -models are Boolean
prealgebras, and vice-versa. This associates Non-Fregean Logic with research on
Hyperintensional Semantics. PI equals SE iff models are Boolean algebras and
CA holds. A representation result establishes a connection to Fine’s approach to
propositional quantifiers and shows that our theories are conservative extensions of
S3–S5, respectively. If we exclude the Barcan formula and a related axiom, then
the resulting systems are still complete w.r.t. a simpler denotational semantics.
Keywords: non-Fregean logic, modal logic, propositional identity, propositional
quantifiers, denotational semantics, hyperintensional semantics
1 Introduction
The semantical approach to some Lewis-style modal logics studied in this paper relies
on the principles of R. Suszko’s non-Fregean logic (see, e.g., [3, 4, 21, 22]). The es-
sential feature of a non-Fregean logic is an identity connective≡ such that (ϕ ≡ ψ)→
(ϕ ↔ ψ) is a theorem but the so-called Fregean Axiom (ϕ ↔ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ) is
not valid. A formula ϕ ≡ ψ can be read as “ϕ and ψ have the same denotation.” The
basic non-Fregean logic is the Sentential Calculus with Identity SCI [3, 4]. SCI ex-
tends classical propositional logic by an identity connective and identity axioms which
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can be given by the following three schemes: ϕ ≡ ϕ, (ϕ ≡ ψ) → (ϕ → ψ), and
(ϕ ≡ ψ) → (χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ]), where χ[x := ϕ] is the formula that results
from substitutions of all occurrences of variable x in χ with formula ϕ. A model of
SCI can be defined as a structureM = (M,TRUE , f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→, f≡) such
that for all elements a, b of the universe M , the conditions (ii)(a)–(e) and (g) of Defi-
nition 3.4 below are satisfied. An assignment (or valuation) is a function γ : V → M
from the set of propositional variables V to M which extends in the canonical way to a
function from the whole set of formulas to M . The satisfaction relation then is defined
as (M, γ)  ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE. More expressive non-Fregean logics which contain
also propositional quantifies and further ingredients are studied, e.g., in [21, 2, 16].
We define a proposition as the denotation γ(ϕ) ∈ M of a formula ϕ in a model
M under a given assignment γ.1 The proposition denoted by ϕ can be identified with
the equivalence class {ψ | (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ} which is the set of all formulas having
the same denotation as ϕ. We call this set the extension of ϕ. An extensional model
contains only two propositions: the True and the False. In such a model, a proposition is
given by its truth-value. If there were only extensional models, then the Fregean Axiom
would be valid and SCI would be equivalent with classical propositional logic. The
intension of a formula ϕ is expressed by its syntactical form.2 In a non-Fregean logic
with propositional quantifiers we call a model intensional if extension and intension of
sentences (formulas with no free variables) can be put in one-to-one correspondence,
i.e., if for all sentences ϕ, ψ, (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ iff ϕ =α ψ. The existence of such a
model (see [16]) ensures that ϕ ≡ ψ is logically valid iff ϕ =α ψ. That is, besides
alpha-congruence, no further identifications between sentences are forced by the logic.
Therein lies the expressive power of non-Fregean logic. Intensions of sentences are no
longer indiscernible and semantic properties can be modeled easily (see, e.g., [14, 15,
16]). This feature, however, can be lost if a specific non-Fregean theory involves too
strong principles.
Early approaches to modality in logics with an identity connective have been de-
veloped by M. J. Cresswell [6, 7] and R. Suszko [21], see also the Historical Note at
the end of [21]. Suszko elaborates two particular SCI -theories which correspond to
the modal logics S4 and S5, respectively. Ishii [12, 13] is able to generalize these
results by modifying the axioms of propositional identity of SCI . His system PCI
corresponds exactly to modal logic K . Moreover, he shows that PCI can be extended
to systems which correspond to many other normal modal logics, including S4 and S5.
All these proposals have in common that the modal operator is introduced or defined
by means of the identity connective: ϕ := ϕ ≡ ⊤. Consequently, there is only one
necessary proposition, namely the proposition denoted by⊤. We call this principle the
Collapse Axiom. Moreover, propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ is given by strict equivalence
(ϕ↔ ψ) and models are forced to be Boolean algebras (with some additional struc-
ture). In particular, logically equivalent formulas, such as ϕ → ψ and ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, are
indiscernible although they express different intensions. We argue that these algebraic
1Suszko refers to the elements of a non-Fregean model as situations. His aim was to develop a situational
semantics [23] as an attempt to formalize aspects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus [20].
2In a non-Fregean logic with propositional quantifiers, alpha-congruent formulas, i.e., formulas that differ
at most on their bound variables, express the same intension and should denote the same proposition. We
write ϕ =α ψ if ϕ and ψ are alpha-congruent.
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constraints are (at least in case of Lewis systems S3 – S5 ) unnecessarily strong and re-
strict the potential of intensional modeling in non-Fregean logic. For instance, in [15]
it is shown that if a non-Fregean model has many necessary (=known) propositions,
then common knowledge in a group can be modeled in a natural way. The approaches
mentioned above adopt the limitations which are already inherent in possible worlds
semantics. In fact, if at a given normal world w (in some Kripke frame), the proposi-
tion denoted by formula ϕ is defined as the set of those worlds which are accessible
from w and where ϕ is true, then ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition iff (ϕ ↔ ψ)
is true at w. Hence, propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ is given by strict equivalence. Sup-
pose now ϕ and ψ are true at w. Since ϕ → (ψ → ϕ) is a theorem, Necessitation
yields (ϕ → (ψ → ϕ)). Applying the K-axiom and Modus Ponens, we derive
(ψ → ϕ). Similarly, we obtain (ϕ → ψ). Thus, ϕ and ψ are strictly equivalent
and denote the same proposition. Thus, the Collapse Axiom (ϕ ∧ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ)
is valid. One goal of this paper is to capture some Lewis modal systems by a non-
Fregean semantics without the above described limitations. In particular, the Collapse
Axiom should be invalid. Consequently, necessity and propositional identity must be
axiomatized independently from each other. A further goal of this paper is to find an
appropriate axiomatization of propositional quantifiers (i.e., quantifiers that range over
the model-theoretic universe of a model) which is independent from specific properties
of the possible worlds framework. In a first approach, we give an axiomatization which
essentially corresponds to that presented by K. Fine [8] and which is sound and com-
plete w.r.t. our first kind of denotational semantics. That axiomatization contains the
Barcan formula, valid in the possible worlds semantics considered in [8, 5], as well as
a related extensional principle. Both principles can be excluded from the original ax-
iomatization if we work with a weaker, simpler and in some sense “more intensional”
denotational semantics which we consider in the last section of the paper.
2 The deductive system
The set Fm(C) of formulas is inductively defined over a set V = {x0, x1, x2, ...}
of propositional variables, a set C of propositional constants such that ⊤,⊥ ∈ C,
logical connectives ¬,→,∨,∧,⊥,⊤, the identity connective≡, the modal operator 
for necessity and a universal propositional quantifier ∀. ϕ ↔ ψ is an abbreviation for
(ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). By var(ϕ), fvar(ϕ), con(ϕ) we denote the set of variables,
free variables, constants occurring in formula ϕ, respectively. These notations also
apply (in the obvious way) to sets of formulas Φ, e.g., fvar(Φ) etc. A substitution is
a function σ : V ∪ C → Fm(C). If u1, ..., un ∈ V ∪ C, ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Fm(C) and
σ is a substitution, then σ[u1 := ψ1, ..., un := ψn] is the substitution which maps ui
to ψi (i = 1, ..., n) and coincides with σ on (V ∪ C) r {u1, ..., un}. The identity
substitution u 7→ u is denoted by ε. Instead of ε[u1 := ψ1, ..., un := ψn] we also write
[u1 := ψ1, ..., un := ψn]. If we write σ : V → Fm(C), then we tacitly assume that σ
is a substitution satisfying σ(c) = c for all c ∈ C. A substitution σ extends to a function
from Fm(C) to Fm(C) which we denote again by σ. We apply postfix notation: ϕ[σ].
The extension is defined canonically in most of the cases: (ϕ ∨ ψ)[σ] := ϕ[σ] ∨ ψ[σ],
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etc. Only the quantifier case needs a specification:
(∀xϕ)[σ] = ∀y(ϕ[σ[x := y]]),
where y is the least variable of V greater than all elements of
⋃
{fvar(σ(u)) | u ∈
fvar(∀xϕ) ∪ con(∀xϕ)}. We say that the variable y is forced by the substitution σ
w.r.t. ∀xϕ.
In analogy to the Lambda Calculus, two formulasϕ, ψ are said to be alpha-congruent,
notation: ϕ =α ψ, if ϕ and ψ differ at most on their bound variables. For instance,
∀x((x ≡ ⊥) ∨ (x ≡ ⊤)) =α ∀y((y ≡ ⊥) ∨ (y ≡ ⊤)). Alpha-congruent formulas
express the same intension and should denote the same proposition in every model.
This is ensured by the model-theoretic semantics.
We assume that ∀xϕ ∈ Fm(C) implies x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Strings such as ∀xc or
∀y(x ≡ x) are not formulas. This can be guaranteed by a suitable definition of Fm(C),
see [16]. Also for a proof of the following fact we refer the reader to [16]. Recall that
ε is the identity substitution. ε applied to a formula may result in a renaming of bound
variables.
Lemma 2.1 ([16]) Let ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C). Then ϕ[ε] =α ϕ. Moreover, ϕ =α ψ ⇔
ϕ[ε] = ψ[ε].
The quantifier rank qr(ϕ) of a formula ϕ is recursively defined in the follow-
ing way: qr(u) = 0 for u ∈ V ∪ C, qr(¬ψ) = qr(ψ) = qr(ψ), qr(ψ@χ) =
max{qr(ψ), qr(χ)}, where @ ∈ {∨,∧,→,≡}, qr(∀xψ) = 1 + qr(ψ).
A sentence is a formula with no free variables. Fmm ⊆ Fm(C) is the set of for-
mulas of basic modal logic, i.e., the set of those formulas which are quantifier-free,
do not contain the identity connective and do not contain constants distinct from ⊥,⊤.
Fmp is the set of those formulas of Fmm which do not contain the modal operator ,
i.e., Fmp is the set of formulas of basic propositional logic. By a substitution-instance
of ϕ ∈ Fmp we mean a formula which results from uniformly replacing some vari-
ables in ϕ by formulas of Fm(C).
All formulas of the following form are axioms:
(i) propositional tautologies and their substitution-instances
(ii) ϕ→ ϕ
(iii) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(iv) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(v) ϕ ≡ ψ, whenever ϕ =α ψ
(vi) (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(vii) (ψ ≡ ψ′)→ (ϕ[x := ψ] ≡ ϕ[x := ψ′]), if x ∈ fvar(ϕ)
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(viii) ∀x(ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (∀xϕ ≡ ∀xψ)
(ix) ∀xϕ→ ϕ[x := ψ]
(x) ∀x(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ)
(xi) ∀x(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ∀xψ), if x /∈ fvar(ϕ)
(xii) ∀xϕ→ ∀xϕ
(xiii) ∀xϕ→ ∀xϕ (Barcan formula)
The set AX of all axioms is the smallest set that contains all formulas (i)–(xiii)
above and is closed under the following condition (*): If ϕ is an axiom and x ∈
fvar(ϕ), then ∀xϕ is an axiom.
The rules of inference are:
• Modus Ponens MP: “From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ.”
• Axiom Necessitation AN: “If ϕ is an axiom, then infer ϕ.”
The resulting deductive system is an amalgam of basic non-Fregean logic SCI
(propositional logic + the axioms of propositional identity (v)–(vii)) and Lewis modal
logic S3 (propositional logic + axioms (ii)–(iv) + rule AN) together with axioms for
propositional quantification (axioms (ix)–(xiii)) and bridge axiom (viii).3 We refer to
that system as S3∀≡. S4∀≡ is the system that results from adding the axiom scheme
ϕ → ϕ. S5∀≡ is obtained by adding the scheme ¬ϕ → ¬ϕ to S4∀≡.
Since the Necessitation Rule is not part of the deductive system, we are able to de-
fine the notion of derivation in the same natural way as in (non-modal) propositional
logic: a derivation of ϕ ∈ Fm(C) from Φ ⊆ Fm(C) is a finite sequence of formulas
ϕ1, ..., ϕn = ϕ such that for each i = 1, ..., n: ϕi ∈ Φ or ϕi is an axiom or ϕi is ob-
tained by rule AN or ϕi is obtained by rule MP applied to formulasϕj , ϕk = ϕj → ϕi,
where j, k < i.
Usually, the Barcan formula (axiom (xiii)) refers to a certain semantic property of
first-order modal logics and in that context it has been the object of some philosophi-
cal debates. The Barcan formula is also considered as an axiom in the approaches to
propositional quantifiers presented by Fine [8] and Bull [5]. In fact, the Barcan for-
mula as well as its converse (axiom (xii)) are valid in the possible worlds semantics.
In our approach, the Barcan formula corresponds to a semantic property which is used
to establish soundness of Axiom Necessitation (see the first equivalence of (3.1) after
Definition 3.4 below). The converse of the Barcan formula ensures that a weak Gener-
alization Rule holds, see Lemma 2.4 below.4 Note that if propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ
is given by strict equivalence (ϕ↔ ψ), then the bridge axiom (viii) is derivable from
the Barcan formula. In the proof of the Completeness Theorem, axiom (viii) ensures
that a certain higher-order function on the universe of the constructed model is well-
defined. In the simpler and weaker semantics defined in the last section, models do not
3We follow a Lemmon-style axiomatization of S3, see, e.g., [11], pp. 199. Note that stating axiom (viii)
implies that variable x occurs free in both ϕ and ψ.
4In contrast to [8], our system does not contain the full Generalization Rule.
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contain that higher-order function and the Barcan formula as well as axiom (viii) can
be avoided.
Definition 2.2 If Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(C), then we write Φ ⊢m ϕ in order to express that
there is a derivation of ϕ from Φ in system Sm∀≡, where m ∈ {3, 4, 5}.
Lemma 2.3 (Deduction Theorem) If Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢m ψ, then Φ ⊢m ϕ → ψ, for m ∈
{3, 4, 5}.
Proof. It is enough to consider m = 3. The assertion can be shown by induction
on the length n of a derivation of ψ from Φ ∪ {ϕ}. If n = 1, then ψ is an axiom or
ψ ∈ Φ ∪ {ϕ} or ψ is obtained by the rule of Axiom Necessitation AN. In the first
two cases, the assertion follows from standard arguments using classical propositional
logic. Suppose ψ = ψ′ for some axiom ψ′. Then Φ ⊢3 ψ′. By AN, Φ ⊢3 ψ′. Since
ψ′ → (ϕ→ ψ′) is an axiom (a substitution-instance of a propositional tautology),
MP yields the assertion. Now suppose n > 1 and the claim is true for all derivations
of length ≤ n− 1. We may assume that the last step in the derivation is MP (all other
cases follow in the same way as before). The assertion then follows from axioms of
propositional logic. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.4 (Generalization) If Φ ⊢m ϕ and x ∈ fvar(ϕ) r fvar(Φ), then Φ ⊢m
∀xϕ, for m ∈ {3, 4, 5}.
Proof. As before, we consider m = 3 and show the assertion by induction on the
length n of a derivation. If n = 1 and the conditions of the Lemma hold, then ϕ is an
axiom or it is obtained by AN (note that ϕ ∈ Φ is impossible). In the first case, ∀xϕ
is an axiom and therefore Φ ⊢3 ∀xϕ. In the second case, ϕ = ϕ′ for some axiom
ϕ′. Then ∀xϕ′ is an axiom, and by AN we obtain Φ ⊢3 ∀xϕ′. Axiom (xii) and MP
yield the assertion. Now we suppose n > 1 and the assertion holds for all derivations
of length ≤ n − 1. We may assume that the last step of the derivation is MP. There
are formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ derived in less steps. If x ∈ fvar(ψ), then by induction
hypothesis: Φ ⊢3 ∀xψ and Φ ⊢3 ∀x(ψ → ϕ). The assertion then follows from axiom
(x) and MP. Now suppose x /∈ fvar(ψ). Since x ∈ fvar(ϕ), the induction hypothesis
yields Φ ⊢3 ∀x(ψ → ϕ). By axiom (xi) and MP, Φ ⊢3 ψ → ∀xϕ. MP yields the
assertion. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.5 (Necessitation) In S4∀≡ and S5∀≡, the Necessitation Principle holds. That
is, for any ϕ ∈ Fm(C), if ⊢m ϕ, then ⊢m ϕ, for m ∈ {4, 5}.
Proof. We fix m = 4 and show the assertion by induction on the length n of a
derivation of ϕ from the empty set. If n = 1, then ϕ is an axiom or ϕ is derived by
the rule AN. In the former case, AN yields ⊢4 ϕ. In the latter case, there is an axiom
ψ such that ϕ = ψ. Then the axiom ψ → ψ and the rule of MP yield ⊢4 ϕ.
Now suppose there is a derivation of ϕ of length n > 1. We may assume that the
last step is MP. There are derivations of formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ of length less than
n, respectively. By induction hypothesis, ψ and (ψ → ϕ) are derivable from the
empty set. Axiom (iii) and MP yield ⊢4 ϕ. Q.E.D.
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Lemma 2.6 For any ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C), ⊢m (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ ≡ ψ), for m ∈ {3, 4, 5}.
Proof. It suffices to consider m = 3. Then
⊢3 (ϕ ≡ ψ) → ((ϕ ≡ x)[x := ϕ] ≡ (ϕ ≡ x)[x := ψ]), by axiom (vii), where
x /∈ fvar(ϕ)
⊢3 ((ϕ ≡ ϕ) ≡ (ϕ ≡ ψ)) → (x[x := (ϕ ≡ ϕ)] ≡ x[x := (ϕ ≡ ψ)]), again by
axiom (vii)
⊢3 (ϕ ≡ ψ) → ((ϕ ≡ ϕ) ≡ (ϕ ≡ ψ)), by transitivity of implication in proposi-
tional logic
⊢3 (ϕ ≡ ψ) → ((ϕ ≡ ϕ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ)), by axiom (ii) and transitivity of implica-
tion
⊢3 (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ ≡ ψ), since (ϕ ≡ ϕ) is a theorem (apply AN to axiom (v))
Q.E.D.
3 Denotational semantics
Recall that a preorder is a binary relation which is reflexive and transitive (but not
necessarily anti-symmetric). There are several ways to introduce Boolean prealgebras
(see, e.g., [9, 17]). We propose the following definition.
Definition 3.1 Let M = (M, f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→,≤M) be a structure with uni-
verse M , operations f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→ on M of type 0, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, respectively,
and a preorder≤M onM . We callM a Boolean prealgebra (or a Boolean prelattice)
if the equivalence relation ≈M defined by
a ≈M b :⇔ a ≤M b and b ≤M a
is a congruence relation on M and the quotient algebra of M modulo ≈M is a
Boolean algebra with lattice order ≤′ given by a ≤′ b ⇔ a ≤M b, and induced
operations f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→ for bottom and top element, complement, supremum
(join), infimum (meet) and implication, respectively (a, b denote the congruence classes
of a, b ∈M modulo ≈M).
A filter F (with respect to ≤M) in a Boolean prealgebraM is a non-empty subset
F ⊆M such that for all a, b ∈M the usual filter axioms hold:
• if a ∈ F and a ≤M b, then b ∈ F
• if a, b ∈ F , then f∧(a, b) ∈ F
• f⊥ /∈ F
An ultrafilter (or prime filter) w.r.t. ≤M is a maximal filter w.r.t. ≤M.5
Notice that any filter of a Boolean prealgebra contains the element f⊤ because in
the quotient Boolean algebra the top element f⊤ is contained in every lattice filter.
5Prime filters, in its general form, are defined in a different way. Recall, however, that in a Boolean lattice
every prime filter is a maximal filter, i.e., both concepts coincide. In [3], the “truth-set” of a SCI -model is
defined in terms of prime filters.
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Lemma 3.2 Let M be a Boolean prealgebra with preorder ≤M and let F be a filter
w.r.t. ≤M. The following conditions are equivalent.
(i) F is the smallest filter, i.e., the intersection of all (ultra)filters w.r.t. ≤M.
(ii) F = {a ∈M | a ≈M f⊤}.
(iii) a ≤M b⇔ f→(a, b) ∈ F , for all a, b ∈M .
Proof. (iii)→(ii): Let a ∈ F . Since f→(a, f→(f⊤, a)) represents a propositional
tautology, it equals the top element of the quotient Boolean algebra. Hence, it is an
element of any filter of the Boolean prealgebra, in particular of F . By (iii), f⊤ ≤M a.
Also a ≤M f⊤ because f⊤ is the top element of the quotient algebra. Now (ii) follows.
(ii)→(i): Let G be any filter. If a ∈ F , then a ≈M f⊤ ∈ G. Since G is a filter, a ∈ G.
It follows that F ⊆ G. Thus, F is the smallest filter.
(i)→(iii): a ≤M b iff a ≤′ b in the quotient algebra with lattice order≤′ iff f→(a, b) =
f⊤ (as in any Boolean algebra). By (i), F is the smallest filter of the Boolean prealge-
bra. One easily shows that the canonical homomorphism a 7→ amapsF to the smallest
lattice filter of the quotient algebra, i.e., to f⊤. Hence, the last condition is equivalent
with f→(a, b) ∈ F . Q.E.D.
If M is a Boolean prealgebra with preorder ≤M, then it is possible that M is al-
ready a Boolean algebra and≤M is not the lattice order≤. In this case,≤ refines≤M.
For, a ≤ b ⇔ f→(a, b) = f⊤ ⇒ a ≤M b. Thus, the smallest filter F w.r.t. ≤M is
a lattice filter of the Boolean algebra M, i.e., a filter w.r.t. ≤. The quotient algebra of
M modulo ≈M (i.e., modulo the lattice filter F ) then is a further Boolean algebra.
Boolean prealgebras are considered as models in research on Hyperintensions where
logical modeling is investigated mainly from the viewpoint of natural language seman-
tics (see, e.g., [9, 17]). It is argued that possible worlds semantics does not provide
enough intensions for the modeling of natural language meanings. Solutions are dis-
cussed where propositions are viewed as elements of Boolean prealgebras. However,
a connection to Non-Fregean Logic, found in the next theorem, seems to have been
unnoticed so far. Boolean prealgebras and models of SCI are essentially the same
objects:
Theorem 3.3 The following assertions (a)–(c) hold true.
(a) If M = (M, f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→,≤M) is a Boolean prealgebra, then M′ =
(M,TRUE , f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→, f≡) is a model of SCI , where TRUE is an ul-
trafilter w.r.t. the preorder ≤M and f≡ is any binary function such that f≡(a, b) ∈
TRUE ⇔ a = b, for all a, b ∈M .
(b) SupposeM = (M,TRUE , f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→, f≡) is a model of SCI . Let F
be the intersection of all sets T ⊆M such that
(M,T, f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→, f≡)
is a model of SCI . Define a ≤M′ b :⇔ f→(a, b) ∈ F . Then ≤M′ is a preorder on M
and M′ := (M, f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→,≤M′) is a Boolean prealgebra such that the
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sets T are ultrafilters and F is the smallest filter w.r.t. ≤M′ .
(c) The transformations described in (a) and (b) are in the following sense inverse to
each other. If M is a Boolean prealgebra, then M′′ =M; and if M is a SCI -model,
then one can find an ultrafilter ofM′ and a function f≡ such thatM′′ =M.
Proof. The proof of (a) is straightforward. We prove (b). One easily checks that≤M′
is a preorder,F is a filter and all sets T such as given in the theorem are ultrafilters w.r.t.
≤M′ . From the definition of F it follows that F = {a ∈M | a ≈M′ f⊤} and ≈M′ is
a congruence relation. Then for the quotient algebra we get a ≤′ b iff f→(a, b) = f⊤,
where ≤′ is the partial order as given in the definition and f⊤ = F . It follows that the
quotient algebra is a Boolean algebra with lattice order≤′.
Finally, we show (c). LetM be a Boolean prealgebra. Then we obtain the SCI -model
M′ according to (a). From M′ we obtain the Boolean prealgebra M′′ in accordance
with the construction in (b). By Lemma 3.2, the preorder of M is exactly the preorder
defined for M′′. Also the universes and operations are the same. Thus, M = M′′.
The second part of the assertion follows readily from the construction. Q.E.D.
We observe that for a given model of SCI one may find a Boolean prealgebra in
a simpler way. Suppose M = (M,TRUE , f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→, f≡) is a model
of SCI . Define a ≤M′ b :⇔ f→(a, b) ∈ TRUE . Then, ≤M′ is a preorder and
M′ := (M, f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→,≤M′) is a Boolean prealgebra. In fact, the quo-
tient algebra modulo ≈M′ is the two-element Boolean algebra.
Definition 3.4 A propositional domain for the language Fm(C) is a structure
M = (M,TRUE ,NEC , f⊥, f⊤, f, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→, f≡, f∀, Γ )
where M is a non-empty set whose elements are called propositions, TRUE ⊆ M is
the set of true propositions, NEC ⊆ M is the set of necessary propositions, f⊥, f⊤,
f, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→, f≡ are operations on M of type 0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, respectively,
f∀ : M
M → M is a higher-order function, and Γ : C → M is the so-called Gamma-
function satisfying Γ (⊥) = f⊥ and Γ (⊤) = f⊤. An assignment for M is a function
γ : V → M . If γ ∈ MV is an assignment, x ∈ V and a ∈ M , then γax is the
assignment which maps x to a and maps variables y 6= x to γ(y). An assignment γ
extends in the following way to a unique function γ : Fm(C) → M . γ(c) = Γ (c) for
c ∈ C, γ(ϕ) = f(γ(ϕ)), γ(¬ϕ) = f¬(γ(ϕ)), γ(ϕ@ψ) = f@(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ)), for
@ ∈ {≡,∨,∧,→}, and finally γ(∀xϕ) = f∀(λz.γzx(ϕ)), where z is any new variable
and λz.γzx(ϕ) denotes the function m 7→ γmx (ϕ) from M to M .6 Given ϕ ∈ Fm,
x ∈ fvar(ϕ), γ ∈ MV , a function t : M → M is said to be (ϕ, x, γ)-definable if
t(m) = γmx (ϕ), for all m ∈ M . A function t : M → M is said to be definable if t is
(ϕ, x, γ)-definable for some ϕ ∈ Fm(C), x ∈ fvar(ϕ) and γ ∈MV . A propositional
domainM is a S3∀≡-model if the following conditions hold:
6Very similar semantics for quantifiers are given in [10, 2]. Note that we cannot simply interpret the
universal quantifier as an infinite meet operation or as the infimum of an arbitrary (infinite) subset. This
would require a complete Boolean (pre)algebra – a condition which is apparently too strong to establish a
Completeness Theorem (see the completeness proof below). Moreover, requiring the existence of countably
complete (non-principal) ultrafilters would involve questions concerning the set-theoretical foundations.
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(i) If NEC 6= ∅, then the relation ≤M on M defined by
a ≤M b :⇔ f→(a, b) ∈ NEC
is a preorder and (M, f⊥, f⊤, f¬, f∨, f∧, f→,≤M) is a Boolean prelattice.
(ii) The following truth conditions hold for all a, b ∈M (even if NEC = ∅):
(a) f⊥ ∈M r TRUE , f⊤ ∈ TRUE
(b) f→(a, b) ∈ TRUE ⇔ a /∈ TRUE or b ∈ TRUE
(c) f¬(a) ∈ TRUE ⇔ a /∈ TRUE
(d) f∧(a, b) ∈ TRUE ⇔ a ∈ TRUE and b ∈ TRUE
(e) f∨(a, b) ∈ TRUE ⇔ a ∈ TRUE or b ∈ TRUE
(f) f(a) ∈ TRUE ⇔ a ∈ NEC
(g) f≡(a, b) ∈ TRUE ⇔ a = b
(h) f∀(t) ∈ TRUE whenever t : M → M is a definable function with image
im(t) ⊆ TRUE 7
(iii) If NEC 6= ∅, then NEC ⊆ TRUE is a filter on M , i.e., for all a, b ∈M :
(a) if a ∈ NEC and a ≤M b, then b ∈ NEC
(b) if a, b ∈ NEC , then f∧(a, b) ∈ NEC
(iv) If NEC 6= ∅, then the following hold for all a, b ∈M :
(a) f⊤ ≤M f≡(a, a)
(b) f≡(a, b) ≤M f→(a, b)
(c) f≡(a, b) ≤M f≡(t(a), t(b)), for any definable function t : M →M
(d) f(a) ≤M a
(e) f(f→(a, b)) ≤M f→(f(a), f(b))8
(f) f(f→(a, b)) ≤M f(f→(f(a), f(b)))
(g) f∀(t) ≤M f≡(f∀(t1), f∀(t2)), whenever t1 is (ϕ, x, γ)-definable, t2 is
(ψ, x, γ)-definable, and t is the (ϕ ≡ ψ, x, γ)-definable function t(a) =
f≡(t1(a), t2(a))
(h) f∀(t) ≤M t(a), for any definable function t : M →M
(i) f∀(t) ≤M f→(f∀(t1), f∀(t2)), whenever t1 is (ϕ, x, γ)-definable, t2 is
(ψ, x, γ)-definable, and t is the (ϕ → ψ, x, γ)-definable function t(a) =
f→(t1(a), t2(a))
7The implication f∀(t) ∈ TRUE ⇒ im(t) ⊆ TRUE , for any definable t, will follow from (iv)(h)
and the fact that TRUE is a filter on M .
8This condition follows from (f) and (d).
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(j) f∀(t) ≤M f→(a, f∀(t′)), whenever t′ is (ψ, x, γ)-definable, and t is the
(ϕ→ ψ, x, γ)-definable function t(a) = f→(b, t′(a)), where b is the deno-
tation of ϕ and fvar(ϕ) = ∅9
(k) f(f∀(t)) ≈M f∀(t′), for every definable function t : M → M and func-
tion t′ : M →M with t′(a) = f(t(a)).
(l) f∀(t) ∈ NEC whenever t : M → M is a definable function with image
im(t) ⊆ NEC10
A S3∀≡-model is called normal if NEC 6= ∅, otherwise the model is called non-
normal. A normal S3∀≡-model is a S4∀≡-model if f(a) ≤M f(f(a)) for every
a ∈ M . A S4∀≡-model is a S5∀≡-model if f¬(f(a)) ≤M f(f¬(f(a))) for every
a ∈M .
Note that if NEC 6= ∅, then TRUE is an ultrafilter. In order to see this, suppose
a ∈ TRUE and a ≤M b. The latter condition implies f→(a, b) ∈ NEC ⊆ TRUE ,
by (i). Then by condition (ii)(b), b ∈ TRUE . By (ii)(a), f⊥ /∈ TRUE . Together with
(ii)(b), this establishes the filter conditions. Using (ii)(c) one shows that TRUE is a
maximal filter.
Observe that the higher-order function f∀ : MM →M satisfies for every definable
function t ∈MM the following conditions:
f∀(t) ∈ NEC ⇔ im(t) ⊆ NEC
f∀(t) ∈ TRUE ⇔ im(t) ⊆ TRUE
(3.1)
The first equivalence is given by the conditions (iv)(l)+(iv)(h). This equivalence is
important for the soundness of rule AN: if ϕ is an axiom and x ∈ fvar(ϕ), then ∀xϕ
is an axiom and, by rule AN, should be mapped to a necessary proposition. The second
equivalence is given by the conditions (ii)(h)+(iv)(h) which ensure the following for
any assignment γ ∈ MV : γ(∀xϕ) ∈ TRUE iff γmx (ϕ) ∈ TRUE for all m ∈ M .
Since TRUE and NEC are filters, a ≈M b implies (a ∈ TRUE ⇔ b ∈ TRUE)
and (a ∈ NEC ⇔ b ∈ NEC ). One also verifies that ≈M is, by condition (iv)(f),
a congruence relation with respect to f. In fact, (iv)(f) establishes monotonicity of
f: if a ≤M b, then f(a) ≤M f(b). However,≈M is, in general, not a congruence
relation with respect to the operation f≡. That is, a ≈M b and a′ ≈M b′ does not imply
f≡(a, a
′) ≈M f≡(b, b
′). In fact, if a = a′ and b 6= b′, then we obtain propositions
f≡(a, a
′) ∈ TRUE and f≡(b, b′) /∈ TRUE with different truth values.
Note that for a non-normal model, the conditions (i), (iii) and (iv) are irrelevant.
Lemma 3.5 (Coincidence Lemma) Let M be a model, ϕ ∈ Fm(C), and let γ,
γ′ : V → M be assignments such that γ(x) = γ′(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Then
γ(ϕ) = γ′(ϕ).
The proof of the Coincidence Lemma is an induction on ϕ, simultaneously for all
assignments γ, γ′. The lemma says in particular that the denotation of a sentence, i.e.,
9The denotation of a sentence is independent of any assignment.
10This condition follows from (iv)(k) together with (ii)(f) and (ii)(h).
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a formula with no free variables, is independent of any assignment and depends only
from the Gamma-function.
Observe that if x, y are distinct variables, then (γax)by = (γby)ax for any assignment
γ and elements a, b of the model-theoretic universe. If x1, ..., xn are pairwise distinct
variables, then we write γa1,...,a2x1,...,xn for the assignment (...((γ
a1
x1
)a2x1)...)
an
xn
.
Definition 3.6 Let M be a model, γ : V →M an assignment and σ : V → Fm(C) a
substitution. Then we denote the assignment x 7→ γ(σ(x)) by γσ.
The next result is an analogue of the Substitution Lemma of classical first-order
logic.
Lemma 3.7 (Substitution Lemma) Let M be a model, γ : V → M an assignment
and σ : V → Fm(C) a substitution. Then
γσ(ϕ) = γ(ϕ[σ]).
Proof. Induction on ϕ simultaneously for all assignments γ and all substitutions σ.
The basis cases ϕ = x and ϕ = c follow immediately from the definition. Most of
the cases of the induction step follow straightforwardly. We show the quantifier case.
Let u ∈ V such that u /∈ fvar(σ(x)) for all x ∈ fvar(∀yψ). Then one easily checks
that (γσ)ay(v) = γauσ[y := u](v) for every v ∈ fvar(ψ) and every a ∈ M . In the
following, let u be the variable forced by the substitution σ w.r.t. ∀yψ. Then:
γσ(∀yψ) = f∀(λz.(γσ)
z
y(ψ))
= f∀(λz.((γ
z
uσ[y := u])(ψ)) by the Coincidence Lemma
= f∀(λz.(γ
z
u(ψ[σ[y := u]))) by the induction hypothesis
= γ(∀u(ψ[σ[y := u]))
= γ((∀yψ)[σ])
Q.E.D.
Notice that the Substitution Lemma implies equations of the following form:
γγ(ϕ1),...,γ(ϕn)x1,...,xn (ϕ) = γ(ϕ[x1 := ϕ1, ..., xn := ϕn]).
Definition 3.8 Let M be a S3∀≡-model, γ : V → M an assignment and ϕ ∈ Fm(C).
Satisfaction (truth) of ϕ in the interpretation (M, γ) is defined as follows:
(M, γ)  ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE .
This notion extends in the usual way to sets of formulas. For Φ ⊆ Fm(C) define
Mod3(Φ) := {(M, γ) | M a normal S3∀≡-model, γ ∈ MV and (M, γ)  Φ}.
Logical consequence is defined as follows:
Φ 3 ϕ :⇔Mod3(Φ) ⊆Mod3({ϕ}).
As usual, we write 3 ϕ instead of ∅ 3 ϕ. Logical consequence for the logics
generated by the class of all normal S4∀≡-models, the class of all normal S5∀≡-models,
respectively, are defined analogously.
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Note that we have defined logical consequence only with respect to the class of
normal models. This is in accordance with the situation in modal logic S3 where
validity of a formula ϕ is defined as truth of ϕ in all normal worlds in all Kripke
models.
It is not hard to show that a normal model satisfies all axioms and rules of inference.
For instance, let ϕ′ be a substitution-instance of the propositional tautology ϕ. In each
Boolean algebra, ϕ is mapped by any assignment to the top element. Then in our
Boolean prealgebras, ϕ is mapped by any assignment to an element of the smallest
filter containing f⊤ (if the model is normal, that filter is NEC ) and thus to an element
of TRUE . By the Substitution Lemma, the same holds for ϕ′. Consider now the
axiom ∀xϕ → ϕ[x := ψ]. Let M be a model and suppose (M, γ)  ∀xϕ for some
assignment γ ∈ MV . Then f∀(λz.γzx(ϕ)) ∈ TRUE . In particular, γax(ϕ) ∈ TRUE
where a = γ(ψ). By the Substitution Lemma, γ(ϕ[x := ψ]) = γax(ϕ) ∈ TRUE .
Now we consider axiom (v), ϕ ≡ ψ whenever ϕ =α ψ. Suppose ϕ =α ψ. By
Lemma 2.1, this is equivalent with the condition ϕ[ε] = ψ[ε], where ε is the identity
substitution. We have γ = γε, for any assignment γ : V → M . The Substitution
Lemma implies γ(ϕ) = γε(ϕ) = γ(ϕ[ε]) = γ(ψ[ε]) = γε(ψ) = γ(ψ). Thus, γ(ϕ ≡
ψ) = f≡(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ)) ∈ TRUE and (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ. Also the soundness of axiom
(vii) follows from the Substitution Lemma and the Coincidence Lemma (alternatively,
one may carry out an induction on ϕ). We leave the remaining cases to the reader.
Theorem 3.9 (Soundness) Φ ⊢m ϕ⇒ Φ m ϕ, for m ∈ {3, 4, 5}.
4 Completeness
Completeness theorems for logics with an identity connective and quantifiers that range
over a universe of denotations of formulas or sentences have been proved by several
authors ( see, e.g., [10, 2, 19, 24]). We apply the typical Henkin construction.
Lemma 4.1 If ϕ is an axiom, c a constant and y ∈ V r var(ϕ), then ϕ[c := y] is an
axiom.
Proof. The assertion is obviously true for most of the axioms. We show the assertion
for axiom scheme (ix): ∀xϕ→ ϕ[x := ψ]. We have
(∀xϕ→ ϕ[x := ψ])[c := y]
= (∀xϕ)[c := y]→ (ϕ[x := ψ])[c := y]
= ∀z(ϕ[c := y, x := z])→ ϕ[c := y][x := ψ′]
= ∀zϕ[c := y][x := z]→ ϕ[c := y][x := z][z := ψ′]
= ∀zχ→ χ[z := ψ′],
where z is the variable forced by [c := y] w.r.t. ∀xϕ → ϕ[x := ψ], ψ′ = ψ[c := y],
and χ = ϕ[c := y][x := z]. Note that y 6= x since y /∈ var(ϕ). The formula
∀zχ→ χ[z := ψ′] is clearly an axiom of scheme (ix). Q.E.D.
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If we want to make explicit that a derivation of a formula ϕ from a set Φ contains
only formulas with constants from C, then we write Φ ⊢C3 ϕ. For a set Φ of formulas
let Φ[c := y] := {ψ[c := y] | ψ ∈ Φ}.
Lemma 4.2 (Elimination of constants) Let C be a set of constants and let c be any
constant, possibly c /∈ C. Put C′ := C ∪ {c}. Then Φ ⊢C′3 ϕ implies Φ[c := y] ⊢C3
ϕ[c := y], for almost all y ∈ V .11
Proof. We show the assertion by induction on the length n of a derivation of ϕ from
Φ in language Fm(C′). If n = 1, then ϕ is an axiom or ϕ ∈ Φ or ϕ is obtained
by rule AN. By Lemma 4.1, if ϕ is an axiom, then ϕ[c := y] is an axiom for any
y ∈ V r var(ϕ). It follows that in all three cases Φ[c := y] ⊢C3 ϕ[c := y], if we
choose y ∈ V r var(ϕ). Now suppose the derivation has length n > 1. We may
assume that the last step of the derivation is Modus Ponens. Then there are formulas
ψ, ψ → ϕ derived in less steps. By induction hypothesis, Φ[c := u] ⊢C3 ψ[c := u] for
almost all u ∈ V , and Φ[c := z] ⊢C3 (ψ → ϕ)[c := z] for almost all z ∈ V . But then
holds both, Φ[c := y] ⊢C3 ψ[c := y] and Φ[c := y] ⊢C3 (ψ → ϕ)[c := y] for almost
all y ∈ V . The last formula equals ψ[c := y] → ϕ[c := y]. MP yields the assertion.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 4.3 Suppose Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(C), x ∈ fvar(ϕ) and c is a constant such
that c /∈ con(Φ ∪ {ϕ}). Then Φ ⊢3 ϕ[x := c] implies Φ ⊢3 ∀xϕ.
Proof. Suppose Φ ⊢3 ϕ[x := c] and the conditions of the Corollary are satisfied.
Since derivation is finitary, we may assume that Φ is a finite set. Then var(Φ ∪ {ϕ})
is finite, too. By Lemma 4.2, we may find an y ∈ V r var(Φ ∪ {ϕ}) such that
Φ[c := y] ⊢3 ϕ[x := c][c := y]. Hence, Φ ⊢3 ϕ[x := y] (c does not occur in
Φ ∪ {ϕ}). Because y does not occur (free) in Φ, we may apply Lemma 2.4 which
yields Φ ⊢3 ∀y(ϕ[x := y]). This formula is alpha-congruent with ∀xϕ. Then the
axioms (v) and (vi) together with MP yield Φ ⊢3 ∀xϕ. Q.E.D.
In our treatment of Henkin sets (Definitions 4.4 and 4.6, Lemma 4.7) we adopt
some ideas and notations from [18].
Definition 4.4 A set Φ ⊆ Fm(C) is called a Henkin set if
• Φ is maximally consistent
• Φ ⊢3 ∀xϕ⇔ Φ ⊢3 ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C
The next observation follows immediately from axioms (xii) and (xiii).
Lemma 4.5 Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C) be a Henkin set. Then:
Φ ⊢3 ∀xϕ⇔ Φ ⊢3 ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C.
11
“for almost all y ∈ V ” means for all but finitely many variables. That is, there are only finitely many
variables y such that the property stated in the Lemma does not hold.
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Definition 4.6 To each pair ϕ, x, where ϕ ∈ Fm(C) and x ∈ fvar(ϕ), we assign
exactly one new constant cϕ,x /∈ C and define
ϕx := ¬(¬∀xϕ→ ¬ϕ[x := cϕ,x]).
Furthermore, Y (C) := {¬(ϕx) | ϕ ∈ Fm(C), x ∈ fvar(ϕ)}.
Note that ¬(ϕx) can be written as ∃x¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ[x := cϕ,x]. In this sense, cϕ,x can
be seen as a witness for the truth of ∃x¬ϕ.
Lemma 4.7 If Φ ⊆ Fm(C) is consistent, then so is Φ ∪ Y (C) ⊆ Fm(C′), where
C′ = C ∪ {cϕ,x | ϕ ∈ Fm(C), x ∈ V } according to Definition 4.6.
Proof. Suppose Φ ∪ Y (C) ⊆ Fm(C′) is inconsistent. There are formulas ¬(ϕx00 ),
...,¬(ϕxnn ) ∈ Y (C) such that Φ ∪ {¬(ϕ
xi
i ) | i ≤ n} is inconsistent. We may assume
that n is minimal with this property. Let x := xn, ϕ := ϕn, c := cn,ϕ, Φ′ :=
Φ ∪ {¬(ϕxii ) | i < n}. Then Φ′ is consistent and Φ′ ∪ {¬(ϕx)} is inconsistent. In
particular, Φ′ ∪ {¬(ϕx)} ⊢3 ⊥. By the Deduction Theorem, Φ′ ⊢3 ¬(ϕx) → ⊥.
Contra-position yields Φ′ ⊢3 ⊤ → ϕx. By MP, Φ′ ⊢3 ¬(¬∀xϕ → ¬ϕ[x := c]). This
yields Φ′ ⊢3 ¬∀xϕ and Φ′ ⊢3 ϕ[x := c]. By construction, c /∈ con(ϕ) ∪ con(Φ′).
We may apply Corollary 4.3 and obtain Φ′ ⊢3 ∀xϕ and Φ′ ⊢3 ¬∀xϕ. But then Φ′ is
inconsistent, a contradiction. Hence, Φ ∪ Y (C) ⊆ Fm(C′) is consistent. Q.E.D.
Definition 4.8 Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C) be maximally consistent. For ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C) define
ϕ ≈Φ ψ :⇔ Φ ⊢3 ϕ ≡ ψ.
Lemma 4.9 Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C) be maximally consistent. Then≈Φ is an equivalence re-
lation on Fm(C) containing alpha-congruence and satisfying the following: if ϕ1 ≈Φ
ψ1 and ϕ2 ≈Φ ψ2, then ¬ϕ1 ≈Φ ¬ψ1, ϕ1 ≈Φ ψ1, ϕ1@ϕ2 ≈Φ ψ1@ψ2, where
@ ∈ {∨,∧,→,≡}. That is,≈Φ is a congruence relation on Fm(C) containing alpha-
congruence.
Proof. By axiom (v),≈Φ is reflexive and contains alpha-congruence. Suppose ϕ ≈Φ
ψ and consider the formula x ≡ ϕ, where x ∈ V r var(ϕ). Since ϕ ≡ ϕ is an
axiom, the axiom (ϕ ≡ ψ) → ((x ≡ ϕ)[x := ϕ] ≡ (x ≡ ϕ)[x := ψ]) together
with MP yields ψ ≈Φ ϕ. Thus, the relation is symmetric. Now let ϕ ≈Φ ψ and
ψ ≈Φ χ. Let δ := (x ≡ χ), where x ∈ V r var(χ). By axiom (vii) and MP,
δ[x := ϕ] ≈Φ δ[x := ψ]). By hypothesis, Φ ⊢3 δ[x := ψ]. Symmetry of ≈Φ, axiom
(vi) and MP yield Φ ⊢3 δ[x := ϕ]. That is, ϕ ≈Φ χ and≈Φ is transitive. Now suppose
ϕ1 ≈Φ ψ1 and ϕ2 ≈Φ ψ2. Let x ∈ V rvar(ψ2) and y ∈ V rvar(ϕ1). By axiom (vii),
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = (ϕ1 ∧ y)[y := ϕ2] ≈Φ (ϕ1 ∧ y)[y := ψ2] = (ϕ1 ∧ ψ2) = (x ∧ ψ2)[x :=
ϕ1] ≈Φ (x ∧ ψ2)[x := ψ1] = ψ1 ∧ ψ2. The remaining cases follow in a similar way.
Q.E.D.
Propositional logic, axiom (vi) and symmetry of ≈Φ imply the next result.
Lemma 4.10 Let Φ be maximally consistent and ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C). Then:
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• ϕ ∈ Φ iff Φ ⊢3 ϕ.
• If ϕ ≈Φ ψ, then ϕ ∈ Φ⇔ ψ ∈ Φ.
Theorem 4.11 Every Henkin set has a normal model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C) be a Henkin set. By ϕ we denote the equivalence class of
ϕ ∈ Fm(C) modulo≈Φ.
Claim 1: For every ϕ ∈ Fm(C) there is a c ∈ C such that c ≈Φ ϕ.
Proof of the Claim: If x ∈ V r var(ϕ), then obviously Φ ⊢3 (x ≡ ϕ)[x := ϕ].
Contra-position of axiom (ix) yields: Φ ⊢3 (x ≡ ϕ)[x := ϕ] → ¬∀x¬(x ≡ ϕ). By
MP: Φ ⊢3 ¬∀x¬(x ≡ ϕ). Since Φ is consistent, Φ 03 ∀x¬(x ≡ ϕ). Because Φ
is a Henkin set, Φ 03 ¬(c ≡ ϕ) for some c ∈ C. Φ is maximally consistent, thus
Φ ⊢3 c ≡ ϕ. This proves Claim 1. Our modelM is given by the following:
M := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fm(C)}
TRUE := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}
NEC := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}
f⊤ := ⊤, f⊥ := ⊥, f(ϕ) := ϕ, f¬(ϕ) := ¬ϕ
f→(ϕ, ψ) := ϕ→ ψ, f≡(ϕ, ψ) := ϕ ≡ ψ
f∨(ϕ, ψ) := ϕ ∨ ψ, f∧(ϕ, ψ) := ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ (c) := c
By the previous results, all these ingredients are well-defined. Furthermore, for t ∈
MM we define
f∀(t) :=
{
∀xϕ, if there is a ϕ such that t(c) = ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C
f⊤, if such a formula ϕ does not exist
Note that Claim 1 implies M = {c | c ∈ C}. It remains to show that f∀ is well-
defined. Let t ∈ MM and suppose there are two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C) such that
ϕ[x := c] = t(c) = ψ[y := c] for all c ∈ C. Without lost of generality, we may as-
sume that x /∈ var(ψ). Then ϕ[x := c] ≈Φ ψ[y := c] = (ψ[y := x])[x := c], for
all c ∈ C. Since Φ is a Henkin set, Φ ⊢3 ∀x(ϕ ≡ (ψ[y := x])). By axiom (viii),
Φ ⊢3 ∀xϕ ≡ ∀x(ψ[y := x]). Note that ∀x(ψ[y := x]) =α ∀yψ. By axiom (v) and
transitivity of ≈Φ we get ∀xϕ ≈Φ ∀yψ, that is, ∀xϕ = ∀yψ = f∀(t). Thus, f∀ is
well-defined. For each ∀xϕ ∈ M , the function t ∈ MM , given by t(c) = ϕ[x := c],
is definable in the sense of Definition 3.4. This follows from the proof of Claim 2
below. Now it is not difficult to verify that M is a normal S3∀≡-model. In particular,
all truth conditions are satisfied. We only consider the conditions (ii)(g) and (iv)(a).
We have ϕ = ψ iff ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ Φ iff f≡(ϕ, ψ) = ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ TRUE . This shows con-
dition (ii)(g). Furthermore, if ϕ = ψ, then ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ Φ. By Lemma 2.6 and MP,
(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∈ Φ. Hence, f≡(ϕ, ψ) = ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ NEC . Thus, condition (iv)(a) holds.
Now let β : V → M be the assignment defined by x → x. We show that the interpre-
tation (M, β) is a model of Φ.
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Claim 2: β(ϕ) = ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ Fm(C).
Proof of the Claim: Induction on the quantifier rank qr(ϕ) of ϕ. By induction on
the construction of quantifier-free formulas one easily shows that the assertion is true
for all formulas of quantifier rank 0. Now suppose the assertion is true for all formu-
las of quantifier rank n. Let qr(ψ) = n and ϕ = ∀xψ. Then β(ϕ) = β(∀xψ) =
f∀(λzβ
z
x(ψ)). Consider the function t defined by t(c) := βcx(ψ). Then t(z) =
λzβzx(ψ). The Substitution Lemma and the induction hypothesis yield: t(c) = βcx(ψ) =
β(ψ[x := c]) = ψ[x := c] for all c ∈ C (note that qr(ψ[x := c]) < qr(∀xψ)). Hence,
β(∀xψ) = f∀(t) = ∀xψ. Hence, β(∀xψ) = f∀(t) = ∀xψ. So the Claim is true.
Consequently:
(M, β)  ϕ⇔ β(ϕ) = ϕ ∈ TRUE ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.12 Every consistent set has a normal model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C) be consistent. We extend Φ to a Henkin set Φ∗ in an ex-
tended language Fm(C∗), C ⊆ C∗. Theorem 4.11 guarantees the existence of a
normal model of Φ∗. Its reduct w.r.t. the sublanguage Fm(C) then will be the desired
model of Φ. Let C0 := C, Φ0 := Φ. If Cn and Φn ⊆ Fm(Cn) are already defined,
then define
Cn+1 := Cn ∪ {cϕ,x | ϕ ∈ Fm(Cn), x ∈ fvar(ϕ)}
Φn+1 := Φn ∪ Y (Cn)
according to the notation of Definition 4.6. By Lemma 4.7, Φn+1 is consistent in
Fm(Cn+1). Finally, we put Φ+ :=
⋃
n<ω Φn. It follows that Φ+ ⊆ Fm(C∗),
where C∗ =
⋃
n<ω Cn. Since derivation is finitary, Φ+ is consistent in the language
Fm(C∗). By a standard argument based on Zorn’s Lemma, Φ+ extends to a maximally
consistent set Φ∗ ⊆ Fm(C∗). If Φ∗ ⊢3 ∀xϕ, then by axiom (ix): Φ∗ ⊢3 ϕ[x := c]
for all c ∈ C∗. On the other hand, suppose Φ∗ ⊢3 ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C∗, where
x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Let n be minimal with the property ϕ ∈ Fm(Cn). Then ϕ[x := cϕ,x] ∈
Fm(Cn+1) and cϕ,x ∈ Cn+1rCn. By construction,¬(ϕx) ∈ Y (Cn) ⊆ Φn+1 ⊆ Φ∗.
Thus, Φ∗ ⊢3 ¬(ϕx). Towards a contradiction suppose Φ∗ 03 ∀xϕ. Since Φ∗ is max-
imally consistent, Φ∗ ⊢3 ¬∀xϕ. Since Φ∗ ⊢3 ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C∗, we have in
particular Φ∗ ⊢3 ϕ[x := cϕ,x]. Thus, Φ∗ ⊢3 ¬∀xϕ ∧ ϕ[x := cϕ,x]. Equivalently,
Φ∗ ⊢3 ¬(¬∀xϕ → ¬ϕ[x := cϕ,x]). That is, Φ∗ ⊢3 ϕx. This is a contradiction to
Φ∗ ⊢3 ¬(ϕ
x) and the consistency of Φ∗. Therefore, Φ∗ ⊢3 ∀xϕ. We have shown that
Φ∗ has the properties of a Henkin set. Let (M∗, β) be a normal model of the Henkin
set Φ∗ ⊆ Fm(C∗) and let Γ ∗ : C∗ → M be its Gamma-function. If we consider the
restriction Γ : C → M of Γ ∗ to C ⊆ C∗, then we get a normal model M w.r.t. the
sublanguage Fm(C), the reduct of M∗. Obviously, (M, β)  Φ. Q.E.D.
If Φ 03 ϕ, then using the Deduction Theorem (Lemma 2.3) one shows that Φ ∪
{¬ϕ} is consistent. The existence of a normal model of that set implies Φ 13 ϕ. The
Completeness Theorem follows.
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Theorem 4.13 (Completeness) For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(C): Φ 3 ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢3 ϕ.
The result extends straightforwardly to Completeness Theorems for the systems
S4∀≡ and S5∀≡ w.r.t. the above defined semantics.
5 Propositional identity, strict equivalence and the Col-
lapse Theorem
Recall that by the Collapse Axiom we mean the scheme (ϕ∧ψ)→ (ϕ ≡ ψ). This
logical property can be expressed in algebraic terms in the following way: “In every
normal model, the smallest filter is {f⊤}.”
Lemma 5.1 Propositional identity w.r.t. a given interpretation (M, γ) is a congruence
relation containing alpha-congruence on Fm(C).12 Strict equivalence w.r.t. a given
interpretation is an equivalence relation on Fm(C). Moreover, propositional identity
refines strict equivalence. That is,
3 (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧(ψ → ϕ)).
Proof. Given a model (M, γ), it follows easily from model-theoretic properties that
ϕ ≈i ψ :⇔ (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ defines a congruence relation on Fm(C) which
contains alpha-congruence. Similarly, the relation ϕ ≈s ψ :⇔ (M, γ)  (ϕ →
ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ) defines an equivalence relation. Now suppose (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ.
This implies γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ). Since (ϕ → ϕ) is valid, f(f→(γ(ϕ), γ(ϕ))) =
f(f→(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ))) ∈ TRUE. That is, (M, γ)  (ϕ→ ψ). Similarly, one shows
(M, γ)  (ψ → ϕ). This shows the last assertion of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Note that strict equivalence is in general not a congruence on Fm(C). The reason
for this fact is the identity connective: see the remarks after Definition 3.4.
If the relations of strict equivalence and propositional identity coincide, then the
algebraic structure of models simplifies dramatically:
Theorem 5.2 (Collapse Theorem) Let M be a normal model and ≤M its preorder.
The following are equivalent:
(i) M is a Boolean algebra and satisfies the Collapse Axiom.
(ii) M is a Boolean algebra with NEC = {f⊤}.
(iii) ≤M is a partial order.
(iv) Strict equivalence coincides with propositional identity, that is:
M  ∀x∀y((x ≡ y)↔ ((x→ y) ∧(y → x))).
12By a congruence relation on Fm(C) we mean an equivalence relation which is compatible with the
connectives ¬,∨,∧,→,,≡ (but not necessarily with the quantifier ∀).
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Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) is clear.
(ii)⇒ (iii): Let≤ be the lattice order. Then f→(a, b) = f⊤ ⇔ a ≤ b, for all a, b ∈M ,
as in any Boolean algebra. But under the condition NEC = {f⊤}, this is exactly the
definition of the preorder≤M in Definition 3.4.
(iii) ⇒ (iv): If (M, γ)  (x → y) ∧ (y → x), then γ(x) ≤M γ(y) and
γ(y) ≤M γ(x). Since ≤M is a partial order, γ(x) = γ(y). Thus, (M, γ)  x ≡ y.
(iv) ⇒ (i): M is a Boolean prelattice with preorder ≤M given by a ≤M b ⇔
f→(a, b) ∈ NEC . Suppose a ≈M b, i.e. a ≤M b and b ≤M a. If we assign a, b to the
variables x, y, respectively, then condition (iv) yields a = b. That is,≈M is the identity
onM and the quotient algebra ofMmodulo≈M isM itself, which, by Definition 3.1,
must be a Boolean algebra. Moreover, by Lemma 3.2, NEC = {a ∈M | a ≈M f⊤}.
Since ≈M is the identity, the Collapse Axiom follows. Q.E.D.
Note that if the normal modelM is a Boolean algebra, then its lattice order≤ is not
necessarily the preorder≤M. In other words, the set NEC , which is a filter w.r.t. ≤M,
may strictly extend the (smallest) lattice filter {f⊤} of the Boolean algebra. Since the
lattice order≤ refines≤M, NEC is also a lattice filter. The lattice order coincides with
≤M if and only if the Boolean algebraM satisfies the Collapse Axiom. Similarly, the
condition of a model M to satisfy the Collapse Axiom is not sufficient for M being a
Boolean algebra: ≤M may be not anti-symmetric.
The models of the modal SCI -theories studied in [21] satisfy the properties (i)–(iv)
of the Collapse Theorem. Also the models of the non-Fregean logic developed by Ishi
[12, 13] are Boolean algebras and satisfy the Collapse Axiom (the identity connective
of that logic, however, satisfies in general not all SCI -axioms of propositional identity).
Theorem 5.3 We consider here the languageFmm of basic modal propositional logic.
If we introduce an identity connective defining
ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧(ψ → ϕ),
then the axiom schemes of propositional identity (v)–(vii) of AX are derivable in S3.13
That is, propositional identity is definable by strict equivalence in S3.
Proof. Suppose a connective ≡ is defined in that way. We consider derivations in
modal logic S3. Since (ϕ → ϕ) is derivable (by Axiom Necessitation), we get
ϕ ≡ ϕ, i.e. axiom (v’) of propositional identity. Axiom (vi) derives from axiom (ii).
In order to prove that axiom (vii) is derivable it suffices to show that the following are
theorems:
• (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (¬ϕ ≡ ¬ψ)
• ((ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ (ϕ′ ≡ ψ′))→ ((ϕ→ ϕ′) ≡ (ψ → ψ′))
• ((ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ (ϕ′ ≡ ψ′))→ ((ϕ ∧ ϕ′) ≡ (ψ ∧ ψ′))
13In this quantifier-free context, we may replace axiom (v) by the stronger (v’): ϕ ≡ ϕ.
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• ((ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ (ϕ′ ≡ ψ′))→ ((ϕ ∨ ϕ′) ≡ (ψ ∨ ψ′))
• ((ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ (ϕ′ ≡ ψ′))→ ((ϕ ≡ ϕ′) ≡ (ψ ≡ ψ′))
• (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ ≡ ψ)
It is known that (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ) is a theorem of S3. Hence, strict
equivalence between ϕ and ψ can be expressed by (ϕ↔ ψ). By propositional logic
and rule AN we get ((ϕ ↔ ψ) → (¬ϕ ↔ ¬ψ)). Axiom (iii) and MP then yield
the first theorem above. Similarly, we get the second, third and fourth theorem. Let
us look at formula number 5. By propositional logic and AN: (((ϕ ↔ ψ) ∧ (ϕ′ ↔
ψ′)) → ((ϕ ↔ ϕ′) ↔ (ψ ↔ ψ′))). By axiom (iii) and MP: ((ϕ ↔ ψ) ∧ (ϕ′ ↔
ψ′)) → ((ϕ ↔ ϕ′) ↔ (ψ ↔ ψ′)). By axiom (iv) and transitivity of implication:
((ϕ ↔ ψ) ∧ (ϕ′ ↔ ψ′)) → ((ϕ ↔ ϕ′) ↔ (ψ ↔ ψ′)). This yields the
fifth theorem. Finally, by axiom (iv) we have (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ) and
(ψ → ϕ) → (ψ → ϕ). Hence, ((ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)) → ((ϕ →
ψ) ∧(ψ → ϕ)). From this one easily derives the last theorem. The scheme of
axiom (vii) now follows by induction on formulas. Q.E.D.
Corollary 5.4 S3 is the weakest Lewis modal system in which propositional identity is
definable by strict equivalence.
Proof. We saw that in S3 all axioms of propositional identity can be derived if one
defines propositional identity by strict equivalence. A particular axiom of propositional
identity is the following: (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ ≡ ψ), i.e., ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧(ψ → ϕ))→
((ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)). This, however, is not a theorem of the weaker
Lewis system S2 as one can show by constructing a Kripke model of S2 (i.e., a Kripke
model with at least one normal world and reflexive accessibility relation) where that
formula is not true. Q.E.D.
6 Representation theorems
K. Fine [8] extends normal modal logics by axioms for propositional quantifiers and
studies several conditions which can be imposed upon the set of propositions. A natu-
ral condition, trivially satisfied in our denotational approach, is that propositions “are
closed under formulas”, i.e., each formula under any valuation denotes (“interprets”) a
proposition. In particular, propositions are closed under Boolean operations. We define
here a S3pi-frame as a triple F = (W,N,R, P ), where W is a set of worlds, N ⊆ W
is a non-empty set of normal worlds, R ⊆W ×W is a reflexive and transitive accessi-
bility relation, and P ⊆ Pow(W ) is the set of propositions (“closed under formulas”).
In particular, ∅,W ∈ P . We may assume here that the only world accessible from a
non-normal world w is w itself. This will be helpful for the definition of proposition
in the context of non-normal modal logic S3. We work with the language Fm(C0)
where C0 = {⊥,⊤}. A valuation is a function g : V → P which extends to the set
of constants such that g(⊥) := ∅ and g(⊤) := W . If g, g′ are valuations such that
20
g(y) = g′(y) for all y ∈ V r {x}, then we write g =x g′. The satisfaction relation for
a normal world w ∈ N is defined as follows:
(w, g)  x :⇔ w ∈ g(x), for x ∈ V
(w, g)  c :⇔ w ∈ g(c), for c ∈ C0
(w, g)  ϕ ∨ ψ :⇔ (w, g)  ϕ or (w, g)  ψ
(w, g)  ϕ ∧ ψ :⇔ (w, g)  ϕ and (w, g)  ψ
(w, g)  ϕ→ ψ :⇔ (w, g) 2 ϕ or (w, g)  ψ
(w, g)  ¬ϕ :⇔ (w, g) 2 ϕ
(w, g)  ϕ :⇔ (w′, g)  ϕ, for all w′ such that wRw′
(w, g)  ϕ ≡ ψ :⇔ (w′, g)  ϕ iff (w′, g)  ψ, for all w′ such that wRw′
(w, g)  ∀xϕ :⇔ (w, g′)  ϕ for all valuations g′ such that g′ =x g
The satisfaction relation for a non-normal world w ∈ W rN is given in the same
way except for the condition concerning the modal operator which is replaced by the
following:
(w, g) 2 ϕ
Let S3pi be the set of formulas true at all normal worlds in all S3pi-frames under all
valuations. If we consider those frames whereN =W , then we obtain the theory S4pi.
S5pi results from S4pi by imposing the additional condition that R in each frame is an
equivalence relation. This is essentially the same way as the theories S4pi and S5pi
are defined in [8]. Of course, our theories contain, in addition, theorems with identity
connective (this connective is not an element of the language considered by Fine [8]).
Note that all axioms of AX belong to S3pi. One also easily checks that
(ϕ ≡ ψ)↔ (ϕ↔ ψ)
(ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ ≡ ψ)
belong to S3pi. Recall that the latter is also derivable from AX (see Lemma 2.6). The
former, however, is valid iff the Collapse Axiom holds (see Theorem 5.2). Note that
(ϕ↔ ψ)→ (ϕ↔ ψ) is not a theorem of S3pi. So we cannot replace ϕ ≡ ψ by
(ϕ ↔ ψ) in every context (both formulas are equivalent in normal worlds but they
do not necessarily denote the same proposition).
In standard modal logic, a proposition is usually regarded as a set of possible
worlds. Relative to a given world w of a given frame one may regard the proposi-
tion denoted by ϕ as the set of those worlds which are accessible from w and where ϕ
is true. Accordingly, two formulas ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition at world w iff
ϕ ≡ ψ is true at w.
Theorem 6.1 Let k ∈ {3, 4, 5}, let F = (W,N,R, P ) be a Skpi-frame and C0 =
{⊥,⊤}. For every world w ∈ W and every valuation g : V → P there exist a Sk∀≡-
model M satisfying the Collapse Axiom and an assignment γ : V → M such that for
all ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C0) the following holds:
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ.
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In particular, (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ ≡ ψ. That is, ϕ and ψ denote the
same proposition in M iff they denote the same proposition in F at world w. Thus,
the concept of a proposition as the denotation of a formula in modelM and the modal
concept of a proposition as a set of possible worlds are equivalent.
Proof. For each p ∈ P let cp be a constant symbol such that p 6= q implies cp 6= cq.
Put C := {cp | p ∈ P}. We may assume that ⊥,⊤ ∈ C. A valuation g : V → P
now extends to a function on V ∪ C such that g(cp) = p. The second clause of the
truth definition above says: (w, g)  c :⇔ w ∈ g(c), where c is now any element of C.
By induction on formulas, simultaneously for all valuations, one shows the following
facts:
Coincidence Lemma: For all w ∈ W and all ϕ ∈ Fm(C), if g(x) = g′(x) for all
x ∈ fvar(ϕ), then (w, g)  ϕ⇔ (w, g′)  ϕ.
Substitution Lemma: For any w ∈ W , p1, ..., pn ∈ P , x1, ..., xn ∈ V , ϕ ∈ Fm(C)
and any valuation g, (w, gp1,...,pnx1,...xn )  ϕ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ[x1 := cp1 , ..., x2 := cpn ].
As a consequence we obtain the following:
(6.1)
(w, g)  ∀xϕ⇔ (w, gpx)  ϕ for all p ∈ P ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ[x := cp] for all p ∈ P.
Now let w ∈ W and let g : V → P be a valuation. Define the relation ≈ on Fm(C)
by ϕ ≈ ψ :⇔ (w, g)  ϕ ≡ ψ. One easily checks that ≈ is a congruence relation on
Fm(C). For ϕ ∈ Fm(C) letϕ be the equivalence class ofϕmodulo≈. Every formula
denotes a proposition (in the terminology of [8], “P is closed under formulas”). Thus,
for each ϕ there is a constant c ∈ C such that ϕ ≈ c. In fact, we may choose c = cp if
ϕ denotes the proposition p ∈ P under the valuation g. Define
M := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fm(C)} = {c | c ∈ C}
TRUE := {ϕ | (w, g)  ϕ}
NEC := {ϕ | (w, g)  ϕ}
f¬(ϕ) := ¬ϕ, f(ϕ) = ϕ, f⊤ := ⊤, f⊥ := ⊥, and f@(ϕ, ψ) := ϕ@ψ
for @ ∈ {∨,∧,→,≡}. The Collapse Axiom holds and NEC = {f⊤}. The above
sets and operations are well-defined and form a Boolean algebra M. We define the
Gamma-function by Γ (c) := c. Finally, the higher-order function f∀ : MM → M is
given by
f∀(t) =:
{
∀xϕ, if there is a ϕ such that t(c) = ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C
f⊤, if such a formula ϕ does not exist
Now we may argue in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 4.11, where a model
for a Henkin set is constructed. By (6.1), Φ = {ϕ ∈ Fm(C) | (w, g)  ϕ} has in fact
the properties of a Henkin set. We show that f∀ is well-defined. Suppose t ∈MM such
that ϕ[x := c] = t(c) = ψ[y := c] for two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C) and for all c ∈ C.
Without lost of generality, we may assume that x /∈ var(ψ). Then ϕ[x := c] ≈ ψ[y :=
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c] = (ψ[y := x])[x := c] for all c ∈ C. That is, (w, g)  ((ϕ↔ ψ[y := x])[x := c])
for all c ∈ C. By (6.1), (w, g)  ∀x((ϕ ↔ ψ[y := x]). The Kripke semantics
implies: (w, g)  (∀xϕ ↔ ∀xψ[y := x]). That is, ∀xϕ = ∀xψ[y := x]. Note that
∀xψ[y := x] and ∀yψ are alpha-congruent. Thus, f∀(t) = ∀xϕ = ∀yψ and f∀ is well-
defined. One verifies that all conditions of a S3∀≡-model are satisfied. For instance,
condition (iv)(k) holds because the Barcan formula and its converse belong to S3pi.
Let γ : V → M be the assignment defined by x → x. In the same way as in Claim 2
of Theorem 4.11 one shows by induction of the quantifier-rank that γ(ϕ) = ϕ for all
ϕ ∈ Fm(C). Then for every ϕ ∈ Fm(C):
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ γ(ϕ) = ϕ ∈ TRUE ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ.
Finally, we consider the “reducts” of both models (i.e., the restrictions of the Gamma-
function, of the valuation g, respectively) to the sublanguage Fm(C0) ⊆ Fm(C).
This yields the assertions. Note that M is the two-element Boolean algebra if w is a
non-normal world. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.2 Let F be a filter of a S3∀≡-model M. Then F is the intersection of all
ultrafilters that extend F .
Proof. Let X =
⋂
{U ⊆M | U ⊇ F is an ultrafilter}. Then F ⊆ X . Suppose there
is a ∈ X r F . Using Zorn’s Lemma (or an appropriate weaker principle) one shows
that F extends to a maximal filter (i.e., an ultrafilter) which does not contain a. We get
a /∈ X , a contradiction. Hence, F = X , i.e., F is the meet of all ultrafilters extending
F . Q.E.D.
Some parts of the next result have parallels to the Jo´nsson-Tarski Theorem which
essentially says that a Boolean algebra with operators is embeddable in the full complex
algebra of its ultrafilter frame (see, e.g., [1] for a detailed discussion). In the proof of the
following Theorem 6.3 we shall construct a desired Kripke model from the ultrafilters
of a given Sm∀≡-model, where m ∈ {4, 5}, such that the same formulas are satisfied.
We were unable to prove the theorem for arbitrary S3∀≡-models. Note that also the
Jo´nsson-Tarski Theorem is applicable only to normal modal logics.
Recall that by Fmm we denote the set of formulas of pure modal logic (without
identity connective and without quantifier).
Theorem 6.3 Let M be a S4∀≡-model and let γ : V → M be an assignment. There
exist a frame (W,R) of modal logic S4, a valuation g : V → Pow(W ) and a world
w ∈ W such that for all ϕ, ψ ∈ Fmm:
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ, and
(M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ ⇒ (w, g)  (ϕ↔ ψ).
(6.2)
Moreover, if the modelM satisfies the Collapse Axiom and is a Boolean algebra, then
the implication in the second line of (6.2) can be replaced by a biconditional⇔, i.e.,
ϕ, ψ ∈ Fmm denote the same proposition in M under γ iff they denote the same
proposition at world w under valuation g.
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Proof. Let TRUE , NEC be the sets of true, necessary propositions, respectively,
≤M the induced preorder of M and W := {T | T is an ultrafilter w.r.t. ≤M}.
Then TRUE ∈ W . For each a ∈ M let |a| := {T | a ∈ T ∈ W}. Define
P = {|a| | a ∈ M}, the set of propositions for the desired Kripke model. For
T ∈ W let NECT := {a ∈ M | f(a) ∈ T } and define the relation ≤T by
a ≤T b :⇔ f→(a, b) ∈ NECT .
Claim 1: For each T ∈ W , NEC ⊆ T .
Proof of the claim. By Lemma 3.2, NEC = {a ∈ M | a ≈M f⊤} and NEC is the
smallest filter.
Claim 2: For each T ∈ W , NEC T ⊆ T . In particular, T is an ultrafilter w.r.t. ≤T .
Proof of the claim. Let a ∈ NECT . By definition, f(a) ∈ T . Since f(a) ≤M a
and T is a filter, we get a ∈ T . This shows the first part of the claim. We have
f→(a, b) ≈M f∨(f¬(a), b)) because M is a Boolean prealgebra. Then a ∈ T and
a ≤T b imply b ∈ T .
Claim 3: For each T ∈ W , NEC ⊆ NEC T . In particular,≤M refines ≤T .
Proof of the claim. Let a ∈ NEC . That is, f(a) ∈ TRUE . f(a) ≤M f(f(a))
because M is a S4∀≡-model. Since TRUE is a filter, we get f(a) ∈ NEC ⊆ T . By
definition, a ∈ NECT .
Claim 4: Every ultrafilter with respect to ≤T belongs to W .
Proof of the claim. By Claim 3, ≤M refines ≤T .
Claim 5: For each T ∈ W , if a ≤T b and a ∈ NECT , then b ∈ NECT .
Proof of the claim. Let a ≤T b and a ∈ NECT . Then f(f→(a, b)) ∈ T and
f(a) ∈ T . f(f→(a, b)) ≤M f→(f(a), f(b)) and T is an ultrafilter. Thus,
f→(f(a), f(b)) ∈ T and finally f(b) ∈ T . That is, b ∈ NECT .
Claim 6: For each T ∈ W , if a, b ∈ NECT , then f∧(a, b) ∈ NECT .
Proof of the claim. Let a, b ∈ NECT . Then f(a), f(b) ∈ T and therefore f∧(f(a),
f(b)) ∈ T . Note that ϕ := x → (y → (x ∧ y)) is a propositional tautology. By
Axiom Necessitation, ϕ is a theorem. By soundness, ϕ is valid. Choose an assign-
ment x 7→ a, y 7→ b. This shows a ≤M f→(b, f∧(a, b)). Since a ∈ NECT , Claim
3 and Claim 5 yield f→(b, f∧(a, b)) ∈ NECT . That is, b ≤T f∧(a, b). By Claim 5,
f∧(a, b) ∈ NECT .
Claim 7: For each T ∈ W , NECT is the smallest filter w.r.t. ≤T .
Proof of the claim. By Claim 5 and Claim 6, NECT is a filter w.r.t. ≤T . Similarly as
in Lemma 3.2 one shows that NECT = {a | a ≈T f⊤}, where a ≈T b :⇔ (a ≤T b
and b ≤T a). Any filter contains f⊤ and the claim follows.
Claim 8: For each T ∈ W , NECT =
⋂
{T ′ ∈W | NECT ⊆ T
′}.
Proof of the claim. Since NECT is the smallest filter w.r.t. ≤T , it is the intersection of
all ultrafilters w.r.t. ≤T . By Claim 4, all those ultrafilters belong to W and the claim
follows.
We define the accessibility relation R on W by:
TRT ′ :⇔ NECT ⊆ T
′.
It is clear that R is reflexive. Suppose TRT ′RT ′′. Let a ∈ NECT . Since we are
dealing with a S4∀≡-model, f(a) ∈ NECT ⊆ T ′. Then a ∈ NECT ′ ⊆ T ′′. Hence,
NECT ⊆ T
′′
. This shows that R is transitive. Note that each NECT is non-empty
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because NEC ⊆ NECT . Hence, there are no non-normal worlds in W . Thus, (W,R)
is a frame of modal logic S4. For a given assignment β : V → M of model M we
define the valuation gβ : V → P by gβ(x) := |β(x)|.
Claim 9: For any ϕ ∈ Fmm, any assignment β : V →M of modelM and any world
T ∈W :
(T, gβ)  ϕ⇔ β(ϕ) ∈ T.
The claim follows by induction on ϕ ∈ Fmm. The basis case ϕ = x is true by the
definition of gβ : (T, gβ)  x ⇔ T ∈ gβ(x) = |β(x)| ⇔ β(x) ∈ T . Most of the
remaining cases now follow straightforwardly from the induction hypothesis and the
definition of an assignment. We show the case ϕ = ψ:
(T, gβ)  ψ ⇔ (T
′, gβ)  ψ, for all T ′ ∈W with TRT ′
⇔ β(ψ) ∈ T ′, for all T ′ ∈ W with TRT ′, by induction hypothesis
⇔ β(ψ) ∈
⋂
{T ′ ∈W | NECT ⊆ T
′}, by definition of R
⇔ β(ψ) ∈ NECT , by Claim 8
⇔ f(β(ψ)) ∈ T, by definition of NECT
⇔ β(ψ) ∈ T, by definition of an assignment
Thus, Claim 9 is true. We consider the world TRUE ∈ W , the given assignment
γ : V →M and the valuation gγ .14 Then for all ϕ ∈ Fmm:
(TRUE , gγ)  ϕ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ (M, γ)  ϕ.
This shows the first part of (6.2). Now suppose (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ for ϕ, ψ ∈ Fmm.
Then γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ). Thus, γ(ϕ) ∈ T iff γ(ψ) ∈ T , for each T ∈ W . Then from Claim
9 it follows that (TRUE , gγ)  (ϕ↔ ψ).
Finally, suppose M is a Boolean algebra that satisfies the Collapse Axiom. Then,
by Theorem 5.2, propositional identityϕ ≡ ψ is given by strict equivalence(ϕ↔ ψ).
The last assertion of the theorem now follows from the first line of (6.2). Q.E.D.
Corollary 6.4 If the modelM in Theorem 6.3 is a S5∀≡-model, then we obtain a Kripke
model (W,R, gγ) of modal logic S5 such that the assertions of the theorem remain true.
Proof. The Claims 1–8 in the proof of Theorem 6.3 remain true. Moreover, Claim 3
can be replaced by the stronger
Claim 3’: For each T ∈W , NEC = NECT .
Proof of the Claim. By Claim 3, NEC ⊆ NECT . Now suppose a /∈ NEC . Then
f¬(f(a)) ∈ TRUE . Since M is a S5∀≡-model, f(f¬(fa)) ∈ TRUE , that is,
f¬(f(a)) ∈ NEC ⊆ T . Thus, f(a) /∈ T and a /∈ NECT . Hence, NECT ⊆ NEC
and therefore NEC = NECT .
The accessibility relation R on W is given as before. Then by Claim 3’, NECT =
NEC = NECT ′ for any worlds T, T ′ ∈ W . Thus, all worlds of W are related by
R, and R is an equivalence relation. Then (W,R) is a frame of modal logic S5. Also
14Note that NEC = NECTRUE . Thus, by Claim 1, the world TRUE accesses every T ∈ W .
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Claim 9 is true. The assertion now follows in the same way as in the proof of the
theorem. Q.E.D.
Corollary 6.5 (Conservative extension) Our denotational semantics captures the stan-
dard modal systems S3–S5 in the following sense. For any ϕ ∈ Fmm and k ∈
{3, 4, 5}, ϕ is a theorem of Sk∀≡ iff ϕ is a theorem of modal system Sk. Consequently,
the theory Sk∀≡ is a conservative extension of modal system Sk.
Proof. Sk∀≡ contains all axioms of Sk. If k ∈ {4, 5}, then, by Lemma 2.5, also
the Necessitation Rule is derivable. Thus, every theorem of Sk is a theorem of Sk∀≡,
for k = 3, 4, 5. Now suppose ϕ ∈ Fmm is not a theorem of Sk. Then there is a
Kripke model of system Sk with a normal world w and valuation g : V → Pow(W )
such that (w, g)  ¬ϕ. That Kripke model can be seen as a frame (W,N,R, P ) with
P = Pow(W ). By Theorem 6.1, there is a normal Sk∀≡-modelM and an assignment
γ such that (M, γ)  ¬ϕ. By soundness, ϕ cannot be a theorem of Sk∀≡. Q.E.D.
7 A simpler and more intensional semantics
AX contains the scheme (viii), ∀x(ϕ ≡ ψ) → (∀xϕ ≡ ∀xψ), which represents an
extensional principle. It can be read as follows: “Two definable functions are equal if
they have the same extensions (the same graphs)”. Our aim is to relax such extensional
constraints whenever this is possible and meaningful. In fact, we are able to define a
weaker semantics such that axiom scheme (viii) as well as the Barcan formula can be
avoided.
Let AX− be the set of axioms which is given by the smallest set that contains all
formulas (i)–(vii) and (ix)–(xii) of AX and is closed under the following condition: If
ϕ ∈ AX− and x ∈ fvar(ϕ), then ∀xϕ ∈ AX−.
As before, an assignment of a model with universe M is a function γ : V → M .
In contrast to the denotational semantics of the first kind, however, there is no canon-
ical way to extend γ to a function γ : Fm(C) → M . In fact, there is no explicitly
given algebraic structure on the universe of a model although parts of such structure
can be restored. Instead of an explicit algebraic structure, there are certain structural
conditions concerning assignments and substitutions. This style of semantics was de-
signed in [19] and has been further developed in [24] and [16]. We shall adopt some
technical machinery coming from the last two works, with some improvements and
simplifications.
Definition 7.1 A simple model M = (M,TRUE ,NEC , Γ ) is given by a non-empty
propositional universeM , sets NEC ⊆ TRUE ⊆M and a function Γ : C →M such
that the following conditions are satisfied.
Structural properties:15
15In [16], the Gamma-function is a function Γ : Fm(C) ×MV → M which extends any given assign-
ment γ ∈MV and maps any formula ϕ to a proposition Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈M . The present definition is equivalent
to the definition given in [16]. The connection is given by: “γ(ϕ) = Γ (ϕ, γ)”.
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• γ(c) = Γ (c) for every assignment γ : V →M and every c ∈ C
• If γ, γ′ : V →M are assignments with γ(x) = γ′(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ), then
γ(ϕ) = γ′(ϕ), for any ϕ ∈ Fm(C). (Coincidence Property)
• If σ : V → Fm(C) is a substitution, γ : V →M is an assignment, and γσ : V →
M is the assignment defined by x 7→ γ(σ(x)), then γ(ϕ[σ]) = γσ(ϕ), for any
ϕ ∈ Fm(C). (Substitution Property)
For all assignments γ : V → M and all formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C) the following truth
conditions hold:
(i) Γ (⊥) ∈M r TRUE , Γ (⊤) ∈ TRUE
(ii) γ(ϕ→ ψ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) /∈ TRUE or γ(ψ) ∈ TRUE
(iii) γ(¬ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) /∈ TRUE
(iv) γ(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE and γ(ψ) ∈ TRUE
(v) γ(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE or γ(ψ) ∈ TRUE
(vi) γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ NEC
(vii) γ(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ)
(viii) γ(∀xϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ γax(ϕ) ∈ TRUE for all a ∈M
(ix) if γ(ϕ→ ψ) ∈ NEC , then γ(ϕ→ ψ) ∈ NEC
(x) if γ(∀xϕ) ∈ NEC , then γax(ϕ) ∈ NEC for all a ∈M
The following Substitution Lemma II is a version of [Lemma 3.14, [14]].
Lemma 7.2 (Substitution Lemma II) Let M be a simple model and ϕ ∈ Fm(C). If
σ, σ′ : V → Fm(C) are substitutions and γ, γ′ : V → M are assignments such that
γ(σ(x)) = γ′(σ′(x)) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ), then γ(ϕ[σ]) = γ′(ϕ[σ′]).
The relation of satisfaction (truth) is defined as before, we use the same notation.
Similarly as before, one verifies that a simple model satisfies all axioms of AX− un-
der any assignment (instead of the Substitution Lemma and the Coincidence Lemma
now apply the Substitution Property and the Coincidence Property, respectively). In or-
der to achieve soundness of the rule of Axiom Necessitation we impose the following
semantic constraint:
Definition 7.3 Let M be a simple model with universe M and the set of necessary
propositions NEC . An assignment γ : V → M is called admissible if γ(ϕ) ∈ NEC
whenever ϕ ∈ AX−. M is called an admissible model if every assignment γ : V →M
is admissible.
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Note that in an admissible (simple) model, NEC 6= ∅.
We write Φ ⊢ ϕ if there is a derivation of ϕ from Φ using axioms from AX− and
the rules of Modus Ponens and Axiom Necessitation. We write Φ  ϕ if for every
admissible simple model M and any assignment γ : V → M , (M, γ)  Φ implies
(M, γ)  ϕ.
Theorem 7.4 (Soundness and Completeness of AX−) For Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(C)
Φ ⊢ ϕ⇔ Φ  ϕ.
Proof. We have already discussed soundness of the calculus and now concentrate on
the completeness proof. The results and definitions 4.1 – 4.10 of the first completeness
proof remain unchanged. Of course, also the Deduction Theorem and Generalization
can be adopted without any restrictions. Our task is now to construct an admissi-
ble simple model for a given set Φ which is a Henkin set w.r.t. the system based on
AX−. The construction is very similar to that given in the proof of Theorem 4.11.
The universe M , the sets TRUE and NEC and the Gamma-function are defined in
the same way. We do not define operations f⊤, f⊥, f¬, f, f→, f∨, f∧, f≡ and f∀. In-
stead, we have to determine in which way an assignment γ : V → M extends to a
function γ : Fm(C) → M such that the structural properties and the truth conditions
of a simple model are satisfied. For a given assignment γ : V → M we fix a function
τγ : V → Fm(C) with the property τγ(x) ∈ γ(x) for every x ∈ V . The Claim 2
below shows that the actual choice τγ(x) ∈ γ(x) is not relevant. We interpret τγ as
a substitution (this implies τγ(c) = c for c ∈ C). As in the first completeness proof,
the relation ≈Φ is defined by Φ ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ, where Φ is maximally consistent, and by ϕ
we denote the equivalence class of ϕ modulo ≈Φ. Then we define the extension of an
assignment γ : V →M by
γ(ϕ) := ϕ[τγ ],
for ϕ ∈ Fm(C).
Claim 2: Let σ, σ′ : V → Fm(C) be substitutions. If σ(x) ≈Φ σ′(x) for all x ∈
fvar(ϕ), then ϕ[σ] ≈Φ ϕ[σ′].
Proof of the Claim: Let fvar(ϕ) = {x1, ..., xn}. We may assume that σ = [x1 :=
ψ1, ..., xn := ψn] and σ′ = [x1 := ψ′1, ..., xn := ψ′2], and we may also assume that
no xi, i = 1, ..., n, occurs free in any of the ψ1, ..., ψn, ψ′1, ..., ψ′n (otherwise, we may
replace such variables in ϕ with others). Then the simultaneous substitutions σ, σ′
can be carried out successively. That is, applying successively axiom (vii) we obtain:
ϕ[σ] = ϕ[x1 := ψ1, ..., xn := ψn] ≈Φ ϕ[x1 := ψ1, ..., xn−1 := ψn−1, xn := ψ
′
n] ≈Φ
ϕ[x1 := ψ1, ..., xn−2 := ψn−2, xn−1 := ψ
′
n−1, x2 := ψ
′
n] ≈Φ ... ≈Φ ϕ[x1 :=
ψ′1, ..., xn := ψ
′
n] = ϕ[σ
′].
Claim 3: The structural conditions of a simple model are satisfied.
Proof of the Claim: Clearly, γ(c) = c = Γ (c) for c ∈ C. In order to show the
Coincidence Property let ϕ ∈ Fm(C) and let γ, γ′ be assignments such that γ(x) =
γ′(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Then τγ(x) ≈Φ τγ′(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Now we
may apply Claim 2. Next, we show the Substitution Property. Let γ : V → M be
an assignment, σ : V → Fm(C) a substitution and ϕ ∈ Fm(C). We must show:
γ(ϕ[σ]) = γσ(ϕ). Recall that γσ : V →M is the assignment given by x 7→ γ(σ(x)),
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Definition 3.6. Then γ(ϕ[σ]) = ϕ[σ][τγ ] and γσ(ϕ) = ϕ[τγσ]. So it is enough to
prove that ϕ[σ][τγ ] ≈Φ ϕ[τγσ]. By induction on formulas one shows that for any χ ∈
Fm(C) and any substitutions σ1 and σ2: χ[σ1][σ2] = χ[σ1 ◦ σ2], where σ1 ◦ σ2 is the
substitution defined by x 7→ σ1(x)[σ2] (“first σ1, then σ2”). So it remains to show that
ϕ[σ ◦ τγ ] ≈Φ ϕ[τγσ]. Let x ∈ fvar(ϕ). By definition, (σ ◦ τγ)(x) = σ(x)[τγ ]. On the
other hand, τγσ(x) ∈ γσ(x) = γ(σ(x)) = σ(x)[τγ ]. Hence, (σ ◦ τγ)(x) ≈Φ τγσ(x),
for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). The assertion now follows from Claim 2. Thus, the Substitution
Property holds.
Claim 4: The truth conditions of a simple model are satisfied.
Proof of the Claim: We show truth condition (iv). γ(ϕ∧ψ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ (ϕ∧ψ)[τγ ] ∈
Φ ⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∧ ψ[τγ ] ∈ Φ ⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ Φ and ψ[τγ ] ∈ Φ. Most of the remaining
truth conditions follow similarly applying axioms from AX−. We concentrate on the
quantifier case:
γ(∀xϕ) ∈ TRUE
⇔ (∀xϕ)[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔ ∀y(ϕ[τγ [x := y]]) ∈ Φ, where y is the forced variable
⇔ ϕ[τγ [x := y]][y := c] ∈ Φ, for all c ∈ C, since Φ is a Henkin set
(∗)
⇔ ϕ[τγ [x := c]] ∈ Φ, for all c ∈ C
(∗∗)
⇔ ϕ[τγc
x
] ∈ Φ, for all c ∈ C
⇔ γcx(ϕ) ∈ TRUE , for all c ∈M
It remains to show that the equivalences (*) and (**) hold.
(*): We have to ensure that y /∈ fvar(ϕ[τγ ]). This follows from the fact that y is the
variable forced by substitution τγ w.r.t. ∀xϕ.
(**): Let z ∈ fvar(ϕ). First, we suppose z 6= x. Then τγ [x := c](z) = τγ(z) ∈ γ(z)
and τγc
x
(z) ∈ γcx(z) = γ(z). Thus, τγ [x := c](z) ≈Φ τγcx(z). Now suppose z = x.
Then τγ [x := c](z) = c and τγc
x
(z) ∈ γcx(z) = c. Again, τγ [x := c](z) ≈Φ τγcx(z). By
Claim 2, ϕ[τγ [x := c]] ≈Φ ϕ[τγc
x
]. (**) now follows from Lemma 4.10.
Truth condition (x) follows similarly using the direction from left to right of the equiv-
alence stated in Lemma 4.5.
Claim 5: M is an admissible (simple) model.
Proof of the Claim: Let γ : V → M be an assignment. We show that γ is admissible.
Let ϕ ∈ AX−. By Axiom Necessitation, ⊢3 ϕ. Let fvar(ϕ) = {x1, ..., xn}. By
Lemma 2.4, ⊢3 ∀x1...∀xnϕ. Applying successively the axiom scheme (ix), we get
ψ := ϕ[x1 := c1, ..., x2 := c2] ∈ Φ, where the ci are constants with ci ≈Φ γ(xi). By
Claim 1 of Theorem 4.11, such constants exist. Moreover, γ(ci) = ci = γ(xi). Now
we apply Substitution Lemma II and the fact that ψ ∈ Φ contains no free variables and
get: γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ) = ψ[τγ ] = ψ ∈ TRUE . By truth condition (vi), γ(ϕ) ∈ NEC .
Thus,
M := (M,TRUE ,NEC , Γ )
is an admissible simple model. Consider now the canonical assignment β : V → M
defined by x 7→ x.
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Claim 6: ϕ[τβ ] ≈Φ ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ Fm(C).
Proof of the Claim: We have τβ(x) ≈Φ ε(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ), where ε is the
identity substitution. By Claim 2, ϕ[τβ ] ≈Φ ϕ[ε]. By Lemma 2.1, ϕ[ε] is alpha-
congruent with ϕ. Alpha-congruence is contained in≈Φ. Then the Claim follows from
transitivity of ≈Φ.
Applying the definitions and Claim 6, we conclude:
(M, β)  ϕ⇔ β(ϕ) = ϕ[τβ ] = ϕ ∈ TRUE ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ.
Hence, (M, β)  Φ. Finally, it remains to show that every consistent set extends to
a Henkin set (in an extended language). We may adopt the construction given in the
proof of Theorem 4.12. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.5 Every S3∀≡-model is an admissible simple model.
Proof. Let M be a S3∀≡-model. By the Coincidence Lemma 3.5 and the Substitu-
tion Lemma 3.7,M has the Coincidence Property and the Substitution Property. Thus,
the structural properties of a simple model are satisfied. The truth conditions follow
from the truth conditions of a S3∀≡-model along with the fact that every assignment
γ : V →M of a S3∀≡-model extends to a function on Fm(C) such as specified in Def-
inition 3.4. Since a S3∀≡-model validates the rule of Axiom Necessitation, the model is
also admissible. Q.E.D.
The converse of Theorem 7.5 is false. That is, the “simple” semantics is strictly
weaker or more general than the semantics of the first kind. This follows from the
corresponding soundness and completeness theorems and the fact that AX− is strictly
contained in AX. Nevertheless, given an admissible simple model M, we are able
to restore the structure of a Boolean prelattice on M . The function f∨, for instance,
is defined as follows. Given any two elements a, b ∈ M , put f∨(a, b) := γ(x ∨ y)
whenever γ is an assignment and x, y ∈ V such that γ(x) = a and γ(y) = b. Of
course, such an assignment and variables can be found. Moreover, that definition is
independent of the particular assignment and the particular variables: Suppose there is
another assignment γ′ and variables u, v with γ′(u) = a and γ′(v) = b. Let σ = ε
be the identity substitution and let σ′ be the substituition [x := u, y := v]. Then
γ(σ(x)) = a = γ′(σ′(x)) and γ(σ(y)) = b = γ′(σ′(y)). Substitution Lemma II
yields: f∨(a, b) = γ(x∨ y) = γ((x∨ y)[σ]) = γ′((x∨ y)[σ′]) = γ′(u∨ v). However,
it is not clear how to restore the higher-order function f∀ without a semantic property
that corresponds to axiom (viii).
One goal of the paper was to present a non-Fregean semantics for some Lewis
modal logics such that the relation of propositional identity does not suffer from too
many restrictions. By the Collapse Theorem 5.2, propositional identity refines strict
equivalence, and both relations collapse iff the given model is a Boolean algebra and
satisfies the Collapse Axiom. The existence of an intensional model would imply that
there are, up to alpha-congruence, no restrictions at all on the relation of propositional
identity, more precisely, ⊢3 ϕ ≡ ψ iff ϕ =α ψ, for all ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm(C). The con-
struction of an intensional model, however, is difficult because of the impredicativity
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of propositional quantification. We believe that a similar construction as in [16] can be
applied.
Finally, we would like to point out that our approach strongly relies on the modal
principles inherent in Lewis modal systems S3–S5 and on the concept of propositional
identity given by the axioms (v)–(vii). A non-Fregean semantics that captures K as
well as many other normal modal systems is found in [12, 13]. This is achieved by
introducing a concept of propositional identity which is axiomatized in a different way.
However, the approach presented in [12, 13] involves the semantic limitations of stan-
dard modal logic: the Collapse Axiom is valid and models are Boolean algebras.
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